1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

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inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Maḥmud, supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq. In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) Mill Iraq Mill

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

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563 657 166 Turkey. The frontier was now established, and the impossibility of settlement in their old homes was cruelly manifest. Schemes for the establishment of the Assyrians in Canada or elsewhere overseas had been considered in London, and abandoned. In spite of 'Iraqi frowns at the self-conscious, ever discontented, and hardly manageable community, it seemed that they must settle in 'Iraq or nowhere. The surviving community of some 20,000 souls could never be concentrated in a single enclave, since 'Iraq afforded none which was sufficient, cultivable, and unoccupied. Hundreds of households of the Baz and Jelu clans had dispersed over the Mosul plain, the upper Tiyari and Takhuma in Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, the lower Tiyari around Barwari Bala. It was hoped next to find room for a thousand households in the Baradost area of Rawanduz qadhā, and for more again in Barwari Zayr. Money was collected in England to assist them, seed and cattle were supplied. Pay earned in the Levies kept many families together; but the preservation of their communal identity, their pride of religion and tradition must devolve upon themselves, as it had devolved for so long on others of the Christian minorities in 'Iraq.

6. THE OTHER NEIGHBOURS

648x The relations of 'Iraq with its eastern neighbour were unsatisfactory; with persistent Persian denial of recognition of the new Kingdom, and with habitual bickering across a thousand-mile open frontier, they could not be otherwise. They grew worse with the controversy arising from the self-exile from 'Iraq of the Persian Mujtahids in 1923 (p. 149), and so persisted after their return next year and after the reopening in 1925 of the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities, in its new railway-borne fashion. They were not improved by the frontier tergiversations of Simko and the Persian Kurds, nor by quarrels, reminiscent of the days before 1914, between Persian and Baṣrawi Customs authorities on the Shatt al-'Arab: nor by the relations of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh with the Bani Lam, though these improved in 1924: nor by the perennial squabble over the Mandali water.

The supersession of the effete Qajar dynasty of Persia in the last days of 1924 by the virile but savage and uneducated adventurer and autocrat Riḍhā Shah Pahlavi at once revolutionized Persian public life in every region, and closely affected its neighbours. The lord of Pusht-i-Kuh, after a panic flight to 'Iraq, returned home to make the best terms he could with the rigidly centralizing dictator. The Shaykh of Muḥammara, Khaz'al Khan, so long the close friend of the British and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, unwisely failed to adapt himself to the new exigencies, and quarrelled with the Persian Government in conditions which gave the British

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founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

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movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director-general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in succession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

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Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

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The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qaḍhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

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Government showed its goodwill by legislating, in March 1927, for a scheme of temporary taxation exemptions.

By the end of 1925 not more than a few hundred houses, it was said, remained to be settled; by the end of 1929, only three hundred. The Baradost scheme had not materialized, thanks to conflicting land claims and Assyrian apathy; but the settlements around 'Amadiya, Zakho, Dohuk, the plains near 'Aqra, the Harir lands of Rawanduz, and the Shaykhan district of Mosul had achieved a fair degree of stability. Thanks to fiscal privileges and the good farming of the villagers and their generally good standing with Kurdish landlords—half the settled lands being Kurdish owned, half State domain—their prosperity compared well with the current living-standards of the region. The relations of the Assyrian leaders with Government were at this period satisfactory, local Mudirs benevolent, and justice obtainable. Optimists could hope for as much assimilation of the ill-fated community as would retain it peaceably as a part of the 'Iraq body politic, no longer a depressed or oppressed alien element. The households of ex-Persian Assyrians who had settled in the towns, with employment in shops and workshops, the railways and the oil companies, the police and domestic service, were useful and self-supporting.

The Assyrian Levies—and there were by 1928 none but Assyrian—continued till the end of the Mandate to see active service in Kurdistan and to earn high praise. Reduction of their strength in favour of the 'Iraq Army began in 1926, and a number of Assyrian soldiers, without their officers, were so absorbed. Units were disbanded, a move of their headquarters and depots made in 1928 from the north to Hinaydi, and most of their posts in the northern highlands were relieved by the 'Iraq Army. From 1929 to 1932 the Levy force remained in being, and was used once more on operations against Shaykh Mahmud; but it had seen its best days and was after 1932 to become a mere body of Air Force camp guards. The men released from it were given each a rifle and ammunition for self-protection in their new homes. The Levies, besides the contribution they could make to the economy of their own community, showed at their best an admirable smartness and willingness to adopt British standards, and excellent endurance, bravery, and skill in the mountain warfare which was highly congenial to them. Their faults were those of a strain of almost savage indiscipline which could appear in bad times, with outbreaks of looting and mass disobedience; a readiness to mix the grievances and politics of their community with their military duties: and their patent lack of loyal feeling towards 'Iraq. Their retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the 'Iraq Army, and their

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by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallah, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Sidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes to construct model villages, good in conception but at present trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Hawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

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even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move of politicians in opposition.

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Hilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Habbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing, reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	106	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	340	—	1	79	160	239	67
Baghdad ..	388	219	2	93	74	167	98
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	31
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	20
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	284
Totals ..	2,824	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	36*

* Mean density total 78,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the consideration of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

166 185 time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

4. Land Revenue Returns

651 4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although in some respects a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left el 'Iraq a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompany-

* Law for the collection of Istihlak (Consumption) Tax. No. 82 of 1931. Law for the collection of Land Rent. No. 85 of 1931.

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
1923	34·20	44·75	16·73	9·62		1·30	2·24	108·84
1924	34·15	47·24	19·34	6·09	2·33	3·70	0·02	112·87
1925	46·13	69·20	23·79	6·03	2·44	1·96	0·04	148·59
1926	42·16	59·94	18·25	5·36	2·47	2·67	0·02	130·89
1927	39·32	59·07	21·60	4·70	3·46	2·98	0·01	131·14
1928	40·94	59·92	23·30	4·63	3·76	2·91	0·04	135·50
1929	87·77		18·92	3·68	3·11	1·87	0·07	115·42
Totals	273·23	391·87	140·93	36·63	21·07	17·39	2·44	883·25
Averages	39·04	55·94	20·13	5·23	3·01	2·48	0·35	126·18

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

Under forms of assessment prescribed by Law 40 of 1920

Crops	Average receipts 1923-9		Percentage distribution under various forms of assessment prescribed									
	In lakhs of rupees	Per cent. of total	By unit of area Art. 6	Estimation Art. 9	Rapid measurement Art. 10	Tree counting Art. 11	By plough units Art. 12	At market centres Art. 14	At Customs and Excise Offices Art. 15	By unit of life Art. 17	Lease by auction Art. 20	Three, four, or five-year agreements Art. 21
Summer crops	39·04	30·6	6·1*	8·5	7·7‡	—	—	—	—	4·6	0·6	3·1
Winter crops	55·94	43·9	6·4	12·4	2·3	—	9·2	—	—	6·9	0·5	8·2
Dates ..	20·13	15·3	9·2†	0·3	—	5·6	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	5·23	3·8	1·2‡	—	—	—	—	2·3	—	0·3	—	—
Other fruits	3·01	2·3	0·1	0·1	—	1·6	—	0·1	—	—	—	0·4
Tobacco ..	2·48	1·9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1·9	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	0·35	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2	—	—	—
Totals ..	126·18	100·0	23·0	21·3	10·0	7·4	9·2	2·4	2·1	11·8	1·1	11·7

This table is intended to illustrate the operation of Law 40, applied during an average year under conditions existing in 1929. Actually estimation was principally resorted to before 1926, the various new methods of assessment having been increasingly used subsequently.

* Largely Amara rice, Baghdad and Kut summer crops and rice included in Basra jarib tax.
† Basra jarib tax.
‡ 1930 figures, previously under Art. 14.
§ Mainly Diwaniya rice.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

166 178 1 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 423 651 619 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective: but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 619 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 427 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is [439] also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,066.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the [166] powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

* A mishara is reckoned =2,500 sq. metres.

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

563 872 But this obstacle can be exaggerated. As a glance at the figures showing the growth of primary education in Iraq indicates, the proportion of girls to boys attending primary schools is not high, but their enrolment is steadily increasing. Although most of the large urban schools are single sex schools, Iraq has the distinction of having many co-educational village schools. The growing number of kindergartens are co-educational. In all the institutions of higher education young men and women work together.

The emancipation of women in Iraq still has a long way to go, but convincing signs of it are evident. It would, nevertheless, be a considerable advance if the Ministry of Education were to encourage the recruitment of a number of women to the staffs of the boys' primary schools. From visits to many Iraqi primary schools it is evident that the standards of the women teachers in matters of personal cleanliness of the children, care and decoration of the school premises, general decorum and pleasant social conduct are higher than those of their men colleagues. Their influence in boys' schools would be most salutary.

464 872 The position of children is, of course, difficult when parents, especially in the rural areas, are dependent upon the labour of even very young children. Yet an increasing number of poor parents appear to be sending their children to school. It would be a great inducement to more and regular school attendance if means could be devised of providing free midday meals for some of the children, especially in the village schools. At one of the more modern primary schools in Baghdad attractively cooked and served midday meals are provided, but this is a school attended mainly by children from comfortable homes where the parents can afford to pay for this service. In the rural areas, however, simple food is not expensive, cooking devices and service are cheap, and it should be possible to provide free meals for the needy children at relatively low cost.

It should be noted that effective child labour legislation does not exist in Iraq. Until the time comes when such legislation can be enacted and enforced, compulsory education will be most difficult to apply.

162 166 871 *Tribal Organization and Mobility of Population.* But the most formidable obstacles of all are those related to tribal organization and mobility of population. There are two particular sets of problems, those of the tribes who are still in a nomadic state, and those of the people who are in the transitional stage of semi-settlement. Between them, it is estimated that these nomadic and semi-settled peoples number nearly 2,000,000 persons, roughly 300,000 of whom are children of primary school age.

3z Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who are passing through this transitional stage present great problems but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

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876 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves,
166 could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed
619 are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'

Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'

First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'

Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

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If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most hopeful and significant economic and social development which is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement.

Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting. He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

(4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

(5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders. So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila area, and the total population of adults and children is between 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural streams'.

It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which has been in operation for only four years and is still in process of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators. Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which, by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed, it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants, apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they make a certain contribution to the public purse through the sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

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with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant in relation to the future development of education in that, if it continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

4q Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI
Kurd MHI

I K 657 648 721 Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish K 728 I 168 166 K [779] authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani, where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

I 653 563 K 221 What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil, where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran. [I K 64x During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other I K 529 650 nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Government to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popularize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret, tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

I K 438 439 The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited by the improvement in public security and communications and is

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

643 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[653] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
● [166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

more brought into use. The government should take steps to survey the possibilities for small projects and to provide assistance in carrying them out, thus giving aid and security to the farm population of the North which now feels that its needs have been neglected and overlooked. 312

In general, however, the North will have to remain dependent on rain-fall to sustain its agriculture. There are apparently still considerable rain-fed areas which can be settled and put to the plow. Particular care should be exercised, however, to insure that the areas are not sub-marginal from the standpoint of either rainfall or fertility and that settlers are really available in the North, which is generally more sparsely settled than the central and southern portions of Iraq. For example, the Mission believes that the prospect of scanty and uncertain rainfall will probably make it undesirable to proceed, except on a very restricted, experimental basis, with the settlement scheme near Balad Sinjar in Mosul province which has been projected by the Agriculture Department. 311

Settlement of New Land

In the past much of the vacant land available for an expansion of crop production which ostensibly belonged to the state has fallen into the hands of big landowners. The so-called Land Settlement Law of 1932, which inaugurated a cadastral survey for the purpose of settling the past confusion regarding land titles and systems of tenure, facilitated this process. It permitted the land settlement committees appointed to administer the law to grant titles (so-called *lazmak* grants) to people who could demonstrate that they had made productive use of land within the previous fifteen years. In practice, it has been possible to obtain title on the presentation of proof that a crop was produced on the land in one year, and the land settlement committees have occasionally accepted even more tenuous proof of cultivation. In this way many sheikhs and other influential persons have managed to obtain title to large tracts of land without any payment whatsoever. Since the cadastral survey is only about half completed, more land may be preempted in this way unless a limit is set on such acquisitions. 425 421

Land definitely adjudged to be state (*miri sirf*) property by the land settlement committees has, however, been set aside for 425 166 421

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

425 421 166 distribution to selected settlers under the terms of a law passed by Parliament in the spring of 1951. This law reflects a growing realization that a class of independent small-holders needs to be created. Settlement areas ranging in size from 2,000 donums in the mountains to 20,000 donums in flow-irrigated land and 80,000 donums in the dry-farming zone are to be established. Units up to 20 donums in mountainous land, 100 donums in flow-irrigated lands, 200 donums in lands irrigated by low-lift pumps and 400 donums in dry-farming lands are to be distributed among farmers, with preference to be accorded to those living in or near the settlement areas. Up to 20 percent of each area may also be allotted to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 percent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates, provided that the committee responsible for the administration of the whole scheme is convinced of their agricultural capabilities. Settlers will be given the opportunity to participate in the work of preparing each area for settlement. The committee will plan the whole settlement, including the sites of houses and public buildings which are to be constructed in accordance with its specifications. The committee will also issue instructions regarding the type and method of cultivation. After ten years farmers who have made good will be granted title to their land without charge, and for a further period of ten years they will not be permitted to alienate their land in any way or to mortgage it except to the state Agricultural Bank. The only exception to this kind of distribution and settlement will be made in the case of state lands which can be irrigated only by high-lift pumps. Such lands may still be leased in tracts up to a maximum of 5,000 donums to a single individual.

425 421 This law, properly administered, will undoubtedly result in great benefit to Iraq. The Mission urges, however, that the government insist on the principle that settlers farm their land themselves without resort to sharecroppers. Otherwise there is a danger that a considerable number of minor landlords will be created, thus defeating the fundamental purpose of the scheme. This principle may be jeopardized both by the selection of non-farmers as beneficiaries and by the contemplated allotment of excessively large

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The Mission believes that the settlers should, as a matter of general principle, be required to make some payment for the extensive benefits received. This is all the more necessary in order not to widen unduly the disparity between the economic status of the favored settlers and that of the great majority of cultivators who will continue to work under much less favorable conditions. Such payments need not be excessively burdensome, since they could be spread over a number of years.

The new law will apply on a broad scale the basic principles of the Dujaila land settlement scheme in south-central Iraq. In the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled there on 100-donum plots allotted from state-owned irrigated land. The Mission was impressed by the results achieved through this scheme. The farmers, who used to be sharecroppers, are conscious of their new-won independence and dignity. By comparison with the fellahin in neighboring areas they appear prosperous and content. Many of them are members of a cooperative—the only one of its kind in Iraq—which owns 10 tractors, two lorries, a flour mill and a club-house. Although the accounts of this cooperative leave much to be desired, its operations are generally along sound lines and indicative of what can be accomplished through state-assisted self-help. The Dujaila scheme is, however, not without defects. Its success as an agricultural venture is jeopardized by the progressive salination of the land because of failure to provide drainage facilities —an omission which should be promptly remedied. The administrative staff appears to be excessively large. Small-scale "landlordism" has crept in, since some farmers have brought in others to do a large part of their work on a sharecropping basis. The farmers were settled in a scattered fashion without regard to the need for community life. Most important, aside from insisting on small fruit gardens, the committee in charge of the project has effected no improvement in farming methods. The Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee, and there are no agricultural experts in the project capable of assisting farmers in raising their standards of cultivation. The improved economic position of the cultivators in the Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to a landlord. In the

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that he can devote his full time to public health work. It will also be important to provide both the provincial and district medical officers with sufficient transportation to enable them to discharge their duties.

VI. Community Planning and Facilities

In the past, communities have unavoidably grown up rather haphazardly. The older parts of the cities are characterized by great congestion, narrow and winding streets, open drains and generally unsanitary living conditions. Livestock are frequently kept in buildings and backyards of major cities. Overcrowding has been greatly aggravated by the influx of people from the land seeking to escape the hard conditions of life in the rural areas and to find opportunities for employment in the cities. Many of these have simply squatted on vacant lots and on the outskirts of cities; they live in primitive, poorly constructed mud and mat huts under conditions of great squalor and without sanitary facilities. Baghdad has about 60,000 of these so-called *sarifa* dwellers and Basra probably no less than 20,000. In each case most of them have immigrated from the province of Amara where problems of land tenure and the silting and salting of land have made conditions of life unusually difficult. Sewage systems are lacking in all of the cities.

Villages are generally clusters of mud houses where, in many cases, men and livestock are not segregated. They have usually grown up around wells or along streams and irrigation canals under conditions where water pollution becomes inevitable. For the most part, safe water supplies are not available. The current flight from the land cannot be arrested as long as the ordinary village lacks the most elementary facilities of sanitation, medical aid, clean drinking water, and schooling, and generally offers little attraction to the person who wants to improve his lot and enjoy a reasonably comfortable life.

Dwellings of mud and mats are not of themselves undesirable. They have the advantage of cheapness and, when properly constructed, are well adapted to climatic conditions in Iraq. Often,

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conditions in the future, the rate could rise to two percent per annum or even higher within a comparatively short period. Obviously this possibility will have to be borne in mind in planning the development of social services such as education and housing. It also has important implications in agriculture. As the limited supply of water is more fully utilized, most of the increase in population may ultimately have to be absorbed in nonagricultural pursuits, unless water is used much more efficiently than it is now.

As the standard of social services such as health and education is higher in the cities and the opportunities for employment are more varied, the distinction between urban and rural population is an important one in considering the age and sex distribution of the people, their occupations and their standard of living. About 550,000 people live in the municipality of Baghdad, another 300,000 in the next three largest cities of Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk and some 350,000 in other towns having a population of over 15,000. Thus about 1.2 million people or a quarter of the population live in sizeable urban communities. In addition, there are about a hundred smaller municipalities having an aggregate population of under half a million. These towns are usually the administrative and market centers of the minor political subdivisions such as *qadhas* and *nahiyas* and many of them are little more than large villages; in many respects they form a semirural category intermediate between the larger towns and the villages.

There has been a strong migration from the country to the cities in recent years, particularly during the last war. The most striking examples of this can be seen in Baghdad and Basra where many thousands of "squatters" from Amara province are crowded together in makeshift huts under extremely unhygienic conditions. The peculiarly adverse conditions of life in Amara have made that province the principal source of migrants to the large cities and, indeed, to most parts of the country, but there has evidently been a substantial movement from the rural areas in general. As it is prima facie likely that these migrants would consist principally of young adults or adolescents, especially men, it is not surprising to find that the census shows a much higher proportion of the very young (under 10) and the old (over 50) in the rural areas, the disparity being even more marked among men than among

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654 423 sive benefits, particularly in relationship to those who are not fortunate enough to be selected as beneficiaries. Moreover, the value of the benefits conferred may be all the more appreciated if some charge, which need not be burdensome, is made for them.

Fourthly, it may be desirable to reconsider the provision exempting the areas irrigated by high-lift pumps from distribution in accordance with the law. Apparently this provision was also dictated by the belief that the requisite pumping facilities would need to be provided by private investment and that such investment was unlikely to be forthcoming unless a comparatively large grant of land was made for development by high-lift pumping. In the future, however, public capital should be made available for the installation of such pumping facilities.

Finally, the safeguards against alienation of the land may need further strengthening. After the two consecutive periods of 10 years each, during which these safeguards would apply, it may still be desirable for the government to retain an option to purchase any of such land offered for sale. In this way it would be possible to prevent, if necessary, the gradual acquisition of excessively large landholdings in these newly developed areas.

A brief comment might be made regarding the settlement possibilities in the rain-fed zone. Much of the land available for such settlement may be submarginal from the standpoint of rainfall. Care must be taken, therefore, not to invest too much in the development of the lands the yield of which will be highly speculative. It is noted that the Department of Agriculture has drawn up an ambitious scheme involving the settlement of 1,000,000 donums and the establishment of 50 villages in northwestern Mosul near Balad Sinjar. There are indications, however, that the rainfall in this region may be insufficient to permit settlers to earn a good livelihood. If attempts are made to carry out this scheme, it is suggested that small-scale tests first be undertaken over a number of years.

654 423 241 166 The law for the development of *miri sirf* lands which has been discussed at length above is basically modelled on the 1945 act under which the Dujaila settlement was established in south-central Iraq near Kut. During the period 1946 to 1950, 1,058 farmers were settled in this area on 100 donum plots allotted from

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state-owned agricultural land. The system of cultivation is prescribed. Thus 40 donums must be devoted to winter wheat and barley and five donums to summer crops. In addition five donums are to be planted with fruit, although evidently only 350 of the older settlers have such gardens in which grapes, greengage, apricots and date palms have been planted.

On the whole, the Dujaila scheme has been conspicuously successful. There is no doubt that the settlers who formerly were poor sharecroppers are now far more prosperous and contented. Most of them are obviously proud of their accomplishments. Their mud houses, although not built according to standard specifications as originally planned, are larger and more substantial than those of other fellahin. As already indicated, interesting experiments with cooperative organization have been carried out. In addition a useful start has been made with the planting of trees along roads and boundary lines.

The Dujaila venture has not, however, been an unqualified success. The failure to install drainage facilities has led to progressive salination and already some of the land has been abandoned. The administrative staff on the spot totals 75 people. Even after allowing for the fact that the staff also controls the distribution of water within the scheme and the operation of two nurseries, this number seems excessive. Aside from insisting that five donums be planted to fruit trees, nothing has been done to improve agricultural and livestock practices. Thus the increased prosperity of the farmers is solely due to the fact that they have more land to till and do not have to surrender a share of their crops to a landlord. There is no agricultural extension service on the spot capable of working with the farmers. In fact, the Department of Agriculture is not even represented on the committee which directs the scheme. Two nurseries are located in the scheme, but they serve simply to supply fruit trees for garden plots and other trees and cannot in any sense be considered demonstration units. It is generally agreed also that the scattered mode of settling the people was ill-advised, since it ignored the need for a community life and made it difficult to provide such community facilities as safe water, schools and health centers.

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congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

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361 they are elaborate and expensive to construct, require a great deal of funds and official attention to maintain, and the benefits are generally beyond the comprehension and appreciation of the average villager. They should, on the contrary, be simple enough so that the villager can both understand the improvement and be anxious to undertake most of the work himself, and will continue to do so for other future improvements. Otherwise, the people of other villages will merely admire the demonstration units and will feel that model villages are beyond their attainment.

New Settlements

Nowhere has the government a better opportunity for the planning of good rural communities than in new settlements such as Dujaila. Settlement in Dujaila began in 1946 and it is clear that a considerable effort was made to give the community an improved [66] layout. In May 1951, there were 1,058 cultivators settled in square lots of 100 donums each (500 by 500 meters). The portion of the Scheme which has been laid out has groups of four houses constructed at the adjoining corners of four lots.[1]

The cultivator is obliged by regulation to plant a garden of a specified area and to build his own house and those of his helpers within the unit under his possession. The Committee which administers the Scheme locates and determines the number of houses and decides on the period within which construction shall [342] be completed. The houses are made of mud or mud bricks, and each consists of a bedroom, a living room, a storeroom, a kitchen, a bath, a water closet and a stable covering a total area of about 80 square meters; a staircase leads to the flat roof. There is also an enclosed courtyard of about 220 square meters which is used by both the family and its livestock. Separate entrances are provided for the people and the animals.

Although the Dujaila settlement is a great improvement on the average village, it has a number of defects. The present layout makes it possible for each cultivator to have his house and those of his assistants on his own unit, but it has spread the population sparsely over a wide area resulting in long distances to community facilities, such as schools and stores, and a lack of the

[1] See diagram on pp. 348 and 349.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

are at present an amalgam of a building code and zoning regulations. These two distinct parts need to be separated and each properly administered.

While the Community Planning Office will have to take the lead in organizing the program, it is essential that it should not attempt to do all the detailed work itself. Although, in some cases, technically good plans may be prepared in this way, the result will be neither popular nor lasting and the planning authority may become a bottleneck. On the other hand, if plans are prepared independently by local authorities or by other government departments, the results will probably be uncorrelated and, therefore, unsatisfactory. The most desirable kind of planning is likely to be achieved by a combination of the two. Although plans should be initiated and later executed by the agencies immediately concerned, the central planning body should guide and coordinate them throughout the various stages. In the larger cities it could probably confine its activity to stimulating interest in the benefits of planning, advising on the preparation of plans and reviewing them at intervals in the course of preparation. In the smaller municipalities, it may have to do more of the actual work, but it should certainly endeavor to enlist as much local advice and cooperation as possible. As was noted earlier, imposition from above is undesirable.

Once plans have been drawn up, the financing of development should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The principal source of funds for capital expenditure should be the Development Board. Whether they are in the form of loans or grants, they should be committed (although not actually credited) sufficiently far ahead for the municipalities to arrange a schedule of work with some degree of confidence. Loans should be made for a longer period and on less burdensome terms, especially as regards amortization. A careful study of a municipality's finances should be made to assess its probable ability to repay.

Slum Clearance

One of the major problems confronting the municipal authorities is the eradication of the worst slum areas of the cities. In Baghdad and Basra, this is a formidable undertaking, since the influx of people from Amara has been very large. Estimates vary

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

362 widely but probably at least 60,000 have migrated to Baghdad
166 and 20,000 to Basra. Amara province is the heart of the rice-growing marshland, where the water buffalo is the prevailing livestock. The immigrants have naturally tended to recreate the conditions of life to which they are accustomed and which will enable them to raise buffalo. An area just outside the eastern bund of Baghdad has been settled by these people and converted to their normal mode of life. A series of stagnant pools for the cattle is interlaced with narrow paths just above the water-level and surrounded by a disorderly array of makeshift huts, called *sarifas*. Being outside the bund, the area is subject to spring floods in years of high water. In Basra the immigrants have settled along the banks of the existing canals. Conditions there are nearly as bad as in Baghdad.

It is clear that the process of migration and the creation of such slums can only be halted by eradicating the cause, namely, the harsh conditions of life in Amara and other places from which the migrants come. Meanwhile efforts will have to be made to resettle those who have already come, since, apart from the plight of the people themselves, these slums are a menace to the health of the entire population of the cities.

362 The few measures so far taken to resettle the sarifa dwellers have not been successful. In Baghdad the Ministry of Social Affairs made a plan for 8,000 mud huts at Shamiya which is about 12 kilometers from Baghdad. Several sample huts of defective construction were erected at the site at a cost of ID 35 each. This plan contemplated the housing of approximately 30,000 people from the sarifa district by giving each family 120 square meters of land apiece on which they were to build their own houses accord-
[342] ing to the samples already constructed. Each hut would have had a covered floor area of 43 square meters consisting of two rooms, a hall and a water closet. The main pipelines for a fresh water supply had been provided and a clinic set up for the use of future residents. The plan, however, was later abandoned on the grounds that the site was too far from Baghdad where most of the prospective residents are employed.

Experience in Basra has been little better. There, the initiative came from the Municipality, which now has under construc-

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

tion 750 dwelling units on a site five kilometers from the city. 362
This and three other city development projects were financed by a 10-year bank loan, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. The original resettlement plans were, however, hastily and incompetently prepared; they were submitted to the Ministry of Interior only a few days before the foundations were laid. Subsequently they were found by the contractor to be so defective that an advisory committee of experienced engineers had to be appointed to review them. The committee recommended many changes in the layout and site engineering of the project, in the design of the houses and in the specifications of materials. Some of the changes, including the installation of an adequate sewage and drainage system, had to be made after construction was well under way.

Ultimately the cost of two-room houses is expected to be about ID 250 and of three-room houses, about ID 300. It is unlikely that the sarifa dwellers can afford to purchase these houses by installment as originally intended. The Municipality now has in mind to build 1,000 mud-and-mat huts at a cost of ID 40 each for sale to the sarifa dwellers.

Other cities besides Baghdad and Basra have their slum problems, though not necessarily of the same kind. For example, all but the most modern part of Erbil is situated on a high mound, rising almost sheer from the surrounding plain. On this mound, which is probably on the site of a city continuously occupied for several thousand years, the houses are packed together with only narrow alleys between them. Waste water runs down the middle of the alleys. The incidence of tuberculosis is said to be high. Less extensive examples of these so-called ancient "citadels" can be found elsewhere, for example, in Kirkuk and at Nabi Yunus near Mosul.

The problem of resettling large numbers of slum dwellers [166]
varies, in kind and in degree, from city to city, but it should in essence be treated as a national problem. It is too important to be subjected to the kind of expediency and faulty technical planning with which it has so far been approached. The job is one for the new Housing Authority, although the municipalities will clearly have to play their part.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example, numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city. When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money: though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24 per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators. This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of the low density of population, an improvement in the water-supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agricultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
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On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north.

It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East.

2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners.

In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

to extend and improve the cultivation of the land and raise the standard of living. This had serious consequences when the war came and brought with it urgent economic problems. The mountain districts did not produce enough cereals to feed the population, and importation on an adequate scale was rendered difficult by the poverty of the Kurdish peasants, the lack of a food-supply organization and the insufficiency of transport. The sense of grievance was further stimulated by the example of the Kurds in Persia, who had thrown off the authority of the Persian Government since the Allied occupation of 1941. In 1943 Mulla Mustafa, the brother of Shaikh Ahmad, rose in revolt in the Barzan district. His rising lasted for several months. Attempts to suppress it failed and it was finally called off after negotiations, and an undertaking by the Government to look into Kurdish grievances. Majid Mustafa himself a Kurd and a distinguished administrator, was appointed Minister without Portfolio with the special duty of devoting himself to Kurdish affairs. His report outlined a scheme of economic and administrative reforms. In the course of 1944 little was done to carry out these or any reforms, and Mulla Mustafa's movement still smouldered; the condition of the Kurds was somewhat improved, however, by the increased cultivation of tobacco, their most important cash-crop.

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The Assyrians

The Assyrians form a distinct community, not only by reason of their Nestorian faith, but also through their language, a Syriac dialect, and their traditions. They are probably the descendants of tribes which moved from the plains of Iraq into the mountains to the north during the period of the Mongol invasion, and remained there until the present generation. In their mountain-home they lived as shepherds, feudally organized under their *maliks* with their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, as their temporal as well as spiritual ruler. They paid a yearly tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, but were in practice autonomous, although their autonomy was always subject to interference by their neighbours the Kurds.

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At the beginning of the First World War they were divided into three main groups: first, the mountaineers in the Hakkiari district of what is now Turkey; secondly, those in the plains to the west of Lake Urmiyah, in Persia; and, thirdly those in the

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20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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563 lowlands to the south of Hakkiari, in what is now Iraq. When
166 the war broke out, the Hakkiari group revolted against the Turks, largely in the hope of Russian help. Driven from their homes, they joined up with their fellow-countrymen and with the Russians around Urmiyah; but the collapse of Russia destroyed their position, and after resisting the Turks for a time, they were forced to flee southwards to Hamadan, where the British military authorities disarmed them and sent them on to the refugee camp at Baqubah near Baghdad.

When the war ended, the problem arose of what to do with the refugees on Baqubah. In 1919 there were some 25,000 of them; most of them were from the Hakkiari group and wanted nothing except to be allowed to return to their native mountains. This, which would have been possible immediately after the war, became impossible when in 1925 the Council of the League of Nations settled the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier in a way which left the Hakkiari region inside Turkey. Thus, the land which the Assyrian refugees regarded as theirs was placed on one side of the frontier while they themselves were on the other; and since the Turkish Government refused to allow them to return, and deported such of them as had returned, the mandatory and Iraqi authorities were left with the problem of finding new homes for them.

By 1930 a great deal had been done to solve the problem. Some thousands had been settled in villages in the northern district of the country (this in addition to those who had returned to their homes to the south of the Hakkiari mountains, and whose position was unaffected by subsequent disturbances). In addition, several thousands had found work in Mosul, Baghdad and other towns. Only a few hundreds still remained unsettled. All this work had been helped by the privileges granted to the refugees by the Iraqi Government and the interest taken in them by the mandatory Power, which had special obligations towards them because of what they had suffered for the Allied cause during the war.

563 Nevertheless, the Assyrians were not contented with their
641 position. Their discontent was partly due to the general unrest and demoralization which their experiences in the war and as refugees living on charity had implanted in them. But it was also due to more particular causes. First, there was their continuing desire to return to their own country, and their refusal

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COTTON IN IRAQ

The problems of land tenure are generally cited as being a restriction to agricultural development. One United Nations' study states the absence of settlement title is undoubtedly a major obstacle to expansion of cultivation of dry land and intensification of agriculture in irrigated or irrigable zones.[40] The same report also points out that the lack of adequate legislation on water rights is another serious defect.[41]

RESETTLEMENT

Sizable areas are being settled by the state under the provisions of a law passed in 1951 which distributes about 67 acres per family to landless people, agricultural school graduates, former civil service employees, pensioners, and the unemployed. The farming program on these projects is supervised rigorously. On the 75,000-acre Dujaila Project on the Tigris River the prescribed planting program is as follows: 20 per cent in wheat, 15 per cent in barley, 5 per cent in fruit, 4 per cent in cotton and flax, 3 per cent in sesame, and 3 per cent in vegetables. Another 5 per cent will be devoted to housing, and the remaining 45 per cent must lie in fallow because of a water shortage.[42]

The Mission report criticized these land settlement schemes on several bases. The land is given to the farmers, the title being transferred after 10 years of successful operation. The Mission believes the land should be sold. The Mission also criticizes the allocation of land to people who have had no farming experience and who have not necessarily shown themselves to be suited by temperament for farming, and it expresses doubt that the program actually has improved the land or the farmer. The economic report stated: "The improved economic position of the cultivators in the new Dujaila scheme is almost wholly due to the fact that the farmer there has a larger plot of land and does not need to surrender a share of his output to his landlord."[43]

There are half a dozen other projects, involving 250,000 acres, in various stages of promotion which the Point Four Mission is being urged to assist in planning and supervising.

IRRIGATION

At present irrigation water is provided by the Kut and Hilla Barrages on the upper Tigris River, several smaller ones on the lower reaches, and the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates River. The water is carried by pumps and canals. About 2 million acres are irrigated by pumps and another 4 to 5 million acres by gravity flow.

Estimates indicated cultivatable land can be expanded almost three times if water is available. Yet, under current conditions, the supply of water does not permit even the effective irrigation of the area already in use. Projects for the storage of excess water which pours down the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers during the spring flood season are clearly essential. The government already has initiated work on the Habbaniya Lake storage system for the Euphrates River and has let the contract for the first stage of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris River. The Development Board is undertaking also construction of three dams on the upper tributaries of the

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40 *Land Reform*, United Nations, 1951, p. 27.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 27.

42 *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, United Nations, December, 1949, p. 31.

43 Boardman, Frances, "Iraq Moves Toward Land Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1951.

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